Defining a catch-up index that measures rich-poor country income convergence and comparing it to within group convergence (β-convergence), defining relative convergence as decrease in rich-poor country income ratio and absolute convergence as decrease in rich-poor country income gap, we derive an equation for years for income equality to the frontier (full convergence). Focusing on relatively homogeneous countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, we show neither region has achieved either within group convergence or significant catching-up since 1951, and 21 of the 28 countries exhibiting catching-up in the most recent 21-years period, using US as the frontier, show falling behind over the longer period. We show years for full convergence depend also on the initial conditions; the neo-classical hypothesis that poorer countries grow faster means relative convergence, relative convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for absolute convergence; "Iron law of convergence" does not hold; and within group convergence is consistent with poorer countries in the group diverging absolutely while richer countries converge.
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Income Convergence and the Catch-up Index
Introduction
This paper is concerned with measurement of inter-country income inequality and comparative development. Sala-i-Martin (1990 introduces the term β-convergence for empirical tests of the neo-classical hypothesis that poorer economies tend to grow faster. 1 The word "convergence" has simultaneously been given the following two meanings by neo-classical theory: a) tendency for the poorer economies to grow faster, and b) eventual equality of all countries' per capita incomes. See, Galor (1996) . This hypothesis is tested by cross-section regressions of growth rates of a group of countries on initial per capita income where β is the regression coefficient. If the regression coefficient is significant and negative, it indicates, on average, the poorer countries in the group are growing faster. Both unconditional and conditional convergence are defined. The latter depends on similarity of the countries' structural characteristics; when they are similar, one need not distinguish between unconditional and conditional convergence.
A seemingly alternative approach to comparative incomes is to examine income ratios over time. The income ratio may either be of the richest to the poorest country, or of a group of rich countries to that of all other countries, or of a select group of rich countries to a select group of poor countries; etc. This literature takes "convergence" to mean reduction of income ratios, is atheoretical, and has no hypothesis of eventual equality of countries' per capita incomes. See, 1 In what follows, we do not use the term β-convergence for the neo-classical hypothesis itself that poorer economies tend to grow faster; we restrict its use to the empirical tests of the said hypothesis.
2 Pritchett (1997) , Jones (1997) , and Cuberes and Jerzmanowski (2009) . Barro (2015) finds unconditional β-divergence at the 0.24% rate for his Case 1, viz. 151
countries from 1960-65 to 2005-10, conditional convergence for a sample of 89 countries for the 1970-75 to 2005-10 period -conditional on variables to be discussed below, and defines what he names to be "iron law of convergence," discussed below. Ho (2006) finds β-convergence for 121 countries at 1.28% annual rate. Lim and Mcleer (2004) interpret β-convergence to mean in a time series context that differences in per capita incomes among a cross section of economies are transitory. Using this frame-work, they do not find income convergence between pairs of ASEAN-5 countries for 1960-92. Peron and Rey (2012) also use time series analysis and examine convergence of Indian Ocean Zone (IOZ) countries' incomes to the IOZ average, and catch-up to the world mean income. They find neither such convergence nor catching-up for the period. Pritchett (1997) considers the 1870 to 1990 period for which no historical data for most developing countries exists. By placing a lower bound on what the 1870 income would have been, and extrapolating backwards from the 1990 levels, he concludes developing countries' fell behind rich countries' Big Time between 1870 to 1990 both proportionately and absolutely.
For 17 presently high-income countries, Maddison (1995) has collected nearly complete historical national income accounts data since 1870 that are comparable across countries. Pritchett (1997) bemoans lack of similar reliable historical data for developing countries. Nevertheless, we now have reliable data for most developing countries since 1950 in PWT. This paper uses countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa to examine income convergence with this data.
Most of these countries became independent after 1946 -only three existed as independent countries before 1947 (Nepal, Liberia, and Bhutan since 1768 , 1847 , and 1907 , respectively, per the CIA's The World Fact Book); the structural factors emphasized in the conditional convergence 3 literature are likely to be relatively homogeneous within each of these two regions; and most of these countries, being in the lower-end in the 1950s, had greater "advantage of backwardness" in the sense of either higher marginal product of capital (as in the neoclassical theory) or of technological imitation (as in endogenous growth model) for narrowing the income gap.
We empirically examine comparative incomes overtime with a different orientation.
Rather than examine whether poorer countries tend to grow faster in general, we use a bench-mark country (the frontier) and examine the extent to which countries are succeeding in their effort to catch-up to the frontier. One can compare the catch-up rates of different countries to infer within group convergence. At the same time, as we show below, the catch-up analysis directly examines poor-rich country income convergence that within group convergence does not.
We do not examine absolute or relative personal poverty or inter-personal distribution of income; but examine relative poverty of a country, i.e., its distance from the frontier, instead.
Empirically, personal income depends greatly on social and economic infra-structure, and the policies of a country where individuals live. For example, Milanovic (2015) demonstrates that where individuals live, rather than individual effort or luck, is behind a greater part of world income differences; and Sala-i-Martin (2006) shows that about two-thirds of individual income inequality in the world is due to cross-country income differences. This paper's focus is on intercountry income inequality rather than income inequality within a country.
Section 2 below defines a catch-up index and relative and absolute convergence. Section 3 examines the relationship between relative and absolute convergence, and derives an equation for number of years for income equality to the frontier. It compares the catch-up index to income ratios and within group convergence (β-convergence) and shows the neo-classical hypothesis (poorer countries grow faster) measures relative convergence, not absolute. Section 4 computes the catch-up index using PWT 9.0 for countries in the sample from 1951 or later (if their PWT data availability year is after 1951) to 2013 . It uses 1971 and 1992 as alternative base years and examines catching-up of the two regions and within-region convergence. Section 5 concludes.
Catch-up Index, and Relative and Absolute Convergence
The catch-up index and relative and absolute convergence are defined as follows. Let yJ0 and yBM0 represent Country J's per-capita RGDP (defined below) for the base year and the benchmark country's per-capita RGDP for Country J's base year, respectively, and RJ0 Country J's base per capita RGDP ratio. Then,
For each subsequent year, similar ratios of a country's annual per-capita RGDP to that of the bench-mark country are computed. Thus, for year t,
We assume the bench-mark country is the richer country for all t. Then,
2 Country J's catch-up index for year t is the ratio of its per capita RGDP ratio for year t to its base per capita RGDP ratio. Let IJt represent this index. Then,
If the value of the catch-up index is greater than 100, or it increases, it indicates catching-2 Generally, US is taken as the bench-mark or frontier country. This is not necessary. The bench-mark or frontier can be any rich country, and one can also use total RGDP and total population of group of rich countries and call these totals as belonging to one country named, say, Frontier; as long as the bench-mark or frontier country satisfies (2). 5 up, i.e., an increase in Country J's (poorer country's) income ratio to the frontier's. If it is less, or it decreases, it indicates falling behind or a decrease in Country J's income ratio to the frontier's. When a poorer country's income ratio increases/decreases, we call it relative convergence/divergence. Of the two terms, catching-up/falling behind or relative convergence/relative divergence, we prefer catching-up. Its focus is on income inequality and it fits in with neo-classical and endogenous growth models' "advantage of backwardness."
In contrast to relative convergence/divergence, absolute convergence/divergence is a reduction/increase in richer-poorer country income-levels gap. As far as I can make out, the phrase relative convergence/divergence has not been used in the context of income levels. Absolute divergence has been used with the same meaning as here -an increase in rich-poor country income gap. On the other hand, absolute convergence has been used to mean convergence to the same income level unconditional on structural characteristics. We call it (absolute unconditional) full convergence; and discuss this literature below.
Let yJt and yKt and yJt+1 and yKt+1 represent the per capita income levels, of countries J and K, ρKt and ρKt+1 the ratios of Country K's per-capita income to that of Country J, and ΔKt and ΔKt+1 the difference between Country K's and Country J's, per-capita incomes for year t and (t + 1).
Assume Country K's per-capita income in period t is higher than Country J's. 3 Then, the incomedifference, ΔKt, is positive, and income ratio, ρKt, is greater than one. Let the (initial) income ratio be h. In symbols,
Subtracting the income ratio for year t from that for year t + 1, we have
The sign of (6) indicates relative divergence or relative convergence. When it is positive (negative), the richer-poorer country income ratio is increasing (decreasing), and we have relative divergence (relative convergence).
Let δyJ and δyK be the change in the two countries income from year t to t + 1. That is,
Then, Country K's income excess over that for Country J in year t + 1, is
Consider now absolute convergence/divergence. Subtracting the income gap for year t from that for year t + 1, we have
.
The sign of (8) indicates absolute divergence or absolute convergence. When it is positive (negative), the richer-poorer country income gap is increasing (decreasing), and we have absolute divergence (absolute convergence).
Substituting (7) and (4) on the right-hand side of (6) and simplifying, we get
We can re-state the condition for relative divergence/convergence in terms of the sign of the last term on the right-hand side of (9), (δyK -h δyJ). When it is positive (negative), the richerpoorer country income ratio is increasing (decreasing), and we have relative divergence (relative convergence).
Relationship Between Different Convergence Concepts
Relative convergence occurs when the income of the poor country (Country J) weighted by the ratio, h, between the income of the rich country (Country K) and that of the poor country increases more than that of the rich country. In symbols, the condition of relative convergence can be written as:
The above condition is equivalent to
where rJ and rK are the (proportionate) growth rates in per capita income of Country J and K, respectively. That is, relative convergence is equivalent to considering that the income growth rate of the poor country is higher than the growth rate of the rich country.
Absolute convergence requires more simply that the income of the poor country increases more than that of the rich country, that is:
We now derive the relationships between relative and absolute convergence. This relationship is given by relationship between the right-hand sides of (8) and (9). We discuss the two situations below:
A. Relative convergence, (δyK -h δyJ) < 0, and absolute convergence: (δyK -δyJ) < 0:
Start with relative convergence, i.e., assume (δyK -h δyJ) < 0. Given that h >1, the relative convergence condition can be met irrespective of whether δyJ is greater, equal or smaller than δyK,
i.e., irrespective of whether we have absolute convergence, absolute divergence, and neither absolute convergence nor absolute divergence. Relative convergence is not a sufficient condition for absolute convergence.
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Now, examine the necessary condition for absolute convergence. Consider the sign of (δyK -h δyJ) as unknown. Start with assuming it to be zero. Given that h > 1, (δyK -h δyJ) = 0 means δyJ is smaller than δyK and we have absolute divergence. Similarly, (δyK -h δyJ) > 0 means δyJ is smaller than δyK and absolute divergence. Only if (δyK -h δyJ) < 0 can δyJ is greater than δyK and we can have absolute convergence. Thus, relative convergence is a necessary condition for absolute convergence. Higher growth rate of the poorer country (i.e., relative convergence) is necessary to ensure absolute convergence, but not sufficient especially when the gap between the gap between rich and poor countries is initially high.
B. Relative divergence, (δyK -h δyJ) > 0, and absolute divergence: (δyK -δyJ) > 0:
Relative divergence clearly implies absolute divergence (since h > 1). That is, relative divergence is a sufficient condition for absolute divergence. For the necessary part, let the sign of (δyK -h δyJ) again be unknown. As shown above, if it is zero or positive, δyJ is smaller than δyK and we have absolute divergence. For the third case of a negative (δyK -h δyJ) (i.e., relative convergence), the relative magnitudes of δyJ and δyK are unknown. Then, we can have δyJ < δyK,
i.e., we can have absolute divergence. We have absolute divergence when there is no relative convergence/divergence (and (δyK -h δyJ) = 0); and we can have absolute divergence when there is relative convergence. Thus, relative divergence (although sufficient) is not necessary for absolute divergence.
When there is no relative convergence/divergence, δyK = h δyJ and δyJ is smaller than δyK.
That is, when the income ratio is unchanged, income gap increases and we have absolute divergence. On the other hand, when there is no absolute convergence/divergence, δyJ = δyK, and (δyK -h δyJ) < 0. Thus, when income gap remains the same, the poorer country grows faster, and
we have relative convergence.
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We summarize these results as Proposition 1: Relative convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for absolute convergence, and relative divergence is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for absolute divergence.
Now, we compare the catch-up index to income ratios and β-convergence.
The catch-up index is not a country's income ratio to the frontier's -it is the ratio of the said ratio for a year to a similar ratio for the base year. Income ratios between rich and poor countries have the problem of income transitions, viz. a country moving from one group to the other, or even the richest and the poorest country changing, over time. When select groups of countries are used, one rich and the other poor, the income ratios will be sensitive to how the country-groups are delineated. By calculating it for each country with reference to one benchmark country, the catch-up index avoids these problems. It also absorbs shocks to the entire region or to the whole world. By expressing change in each country's income ratios as an index, the indices for different countries can be combined to get a region's catch-up. Income ratios cannot be so combined.
β-convergence is theory-based. Neo-classical theory predicts per capita incomes become equal to one another in the long-run, independent of their initial conditions; but gives no guidance for determining the years to achieve income equality. See, Galor (1996) . The catch-up index shows what the historical facts reveal. Using it, we can derive an equation to determine years for income equality or years for full convergence.
Let rI represent the annual (proportionate) catching-up rate, i.e., growth rate of the catchup index (defined by (3)) of Country J to the bench-mark country since the base year 0, and rBM the corresponding (proportionate) growth rates in per capita income of the bench-mark country.
Then, it can be shown that
(12) shows the catching-up rate depends on our choice of the bench-mark country: Higher is the growth rate of the selected bench-mark country, lower is the catching-up rate. Let n be the year Country J's income becomes equal to the frontier's. From (1) and (3),
Using the compound growth expression and solving for n,
( 13) shows that a) the number of years for full convergence (for income to equal the frontier's) depends not only on the catching-up (relative growth) rate but also on the initial conditions; and b) higher is the catching-up rate and/or higher is the initial income ratio, smaller is the number of years for full convergence. 4 These results are stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: a) The number of years for full convergence (for income to equal the frontier's)
depends not only on the catching-up (relative growth) rate but also on the initial conditions -in contrast from the neo-classical theory's prediction of eventual equality of incomes across countries that is independent of initial conditions; and b) higher is the catching-up rate and/or higher is the initial income ratio, smaller is the number of years for full convergence. Barro (2015, p. 911) uses the phrase "iron law of convergence," under which "countries eliminate gaps in levels of real per capita GDP at a rate around 2% per year. Convergence at a 2% rate implies that it takes 35 years for half of an initial gap to vanish and 115 years for 90% to disappear." Nevertheless, a 2% higher growth rate does not mean income gap is decreasing by 2% each year: it may take generations of growth at the higher rate before income gaps start decreasing. Rather than a "law of convergence," Barro's iron law is simply an arithmetic fact that any real-valued number that decreases by 2% each year will become about 50% of its initial value in 35 years and 10% of its initial value in 115 years.
We next show neo-classical convergence gives relative convergence, not absolute.
Irrespective of whether it is unconditional or conditional, neo-classical convergence states a poorer country tends to grow faster. Using our notation and (4), neo-classical convergence can be stated
(yJ,t δyK -yK,t δyJ) = yJt (δyK -h δyJ) < 0
The algebraic expression on the left of the inequality sign in (14) is the same as that on the right hand side of (9). We have seen above that when (9) is negative, we have relative convergence.
That is, neo-classical convergence and relative convergence are equivalent statements. Similarly, neo-classical divergence and relative divergence are equivalent statements. Using Proposition 1, neo-classical convergence only indicates richer-poorer country income ratio is decreasing; it has no implication for whether or not richer-poorer country income gap is decreasing (i.e., whether
No simple algebraic expression (like we have derived for years for full convergence) can be derived for the number of years of relative convergence it would take for absolute income gap to starts decreasing. A heuristic exercise (with numbers based on what we calculate below) shows if the US is the bench-mark country and its initial income is $24,000, Country J's $300, and the catch-up rate is 1%, it will take 409 years of relative convergence (at 1% annual rate) for absolute convergence to start. On the other hand, if Country J's initial income is $4,800 and the catch-up rate is 5%, it will take 9 years of relative convergence (at 5% annual rate) for absolute convergence to start. Clearly, even if we know the relative convergence rate, no statement about absolute convergence, e.g., for the income gap to even start decreasing, can be made without knowing the initial income difference.
Sala-i-Martin (2002, p. 36) states "As China and India grew (at a faster rate than the rich world), the incomes of their numerous citizens tended to converge to those of the citizens of the rich world." Suppose China or India's initial income was $1,200 and that of the US $24,000. (In 1971, US PPP PCY was $24,185, and that of China and India were $1,342 and $1,299, respectively). Then, if they were growing at a consistently faster 5 % rate, their incomes will diverge from the US for 37 years. On the other hand, if they were growing at a consistently faster 1 % rate only, their incomes will diverge from the US for 266 years, etc. Faster growth is consistent with absolute divergence.
In the β-convergence literature, Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003) , use the phrase absolute divergence with the same meaning given above (i.e., an increase in rich-poor income gap). Barro (2015), Galor (1996) , Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, (1992) use absolute convergence to mean unconditional (full) convergence of per capita incomes of countries to one another in the long-run independent of their initial conditions. For example, Barro (2015, 911) states "This convergence [at 2% rate for US states] was absolute in the sense of not having to be conditioned on a set of variables that capture differences in long-run positions."
Following this definition and imperative, β-convergence regressions (irrespective of whether they are unconditional or conditional) have interpreted the convergence shown by such regressions to be absolute convergence (see, Sala-i-Martin, 1996, for example)
Other differences between the catch-up index and β-convergence may be noted. The catchup index measures rich-poor convergence; β-convergence measures within-group convergence.
Since regression analysis measures the average relationship between the regressand and the regressors, even if the β-regression coefficient has the right sign, it only means average relative convergence for a group of countries. It does not mean every poorer country's income ratio with the richer country is increasing; and at the same rate. Relative convergence shown by it may be due to richer countries in the sample increasing their income ratio with still richer countries while lower-level poorer countries are falling behind both relatively and absolutely (since relative divergence is sufficient for absolute divergence). 5 In contrast, an increasing catch-up index ensures the necessary condition for absolute income gap to decrease is met. β-convergence is not directly helpful for examining poor-rich country income gaps; even though, many works on it motivate their contributions by highlighting as if their focus is on poor-rich country income gaps.
For example, the first paragraph of Sala-i-Martin (1996) is wholly on this question.
Some other advantages of the catch-up index are: Being an index, individual unique indices can be combined to yield information on a group or a region's catch-up to the frontier. Growth rates (and income ratios) cannot be similarly combined since the base values will be different. 
Catch-up Index for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

Index by Countries
We now construct the catch-up index for South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa; first by countries. The index is based on PWT 9.0 (available at http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt).
Starting with version 8.0 (the new generation), PWT gives two versions of real GDP: using prices that are constant across countries but depend on the current year, CGDP; and using prices that are constant across countries and are also constant over time, RGDP. The R variables are well-suited for comparisons across countries and over time (see, Feenstra, et al. (2015) ), and we use them.
We first take US as the frontier (and explain this choice and use an alternative bench-mark (0.90%), Gabon (1.14%), India (0.88%), and Lesotho (0.65%).
<Insert Table 1US here.> Table 1US gives catching-up rates over a long period -a maximum of 62 years. We next inquire whether the catching-up performance is different over more recent periods. We consider None of the tables/figures meet the expectations of β-convergence. We can also run β-convergence regressions for either region. They can either be of the catching-up rates on income ratios or of PCY growth rates (obtained by subtracting the US PCY growth rate from the catchingup rates) on the initial PCY levels. None of these regression equations are statistically significant. Table 1US , figures, and β-convergence regressions do not support within region convergence in either region.
At the same time, our analysis gives meaningful results about catching-up/falling-behind the frontier. Since the initial base year (see , Table 1US ), four of the six South Asian countries have either fallen behind or caught-up at miniscule rates giving 2729 to 5184 years for full convergence or income equality with the US; so have 33 of the 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In Figures 1a and 1b ( The above analysis shows that depending on the choice of the base year, the conclusions regarding convergence/divergence may be contradictory. The catch-up rate is the excess (or short fall) of a country's income's growth rate over the bench mark country. US as the bench mark is attractive because it is getting steadily richer at about 2% yearly since 1951. Then the same country that is catching-up from one base year, may be falling-behind from another base year because it gets richer at more than 2% from one base year and at less than 2% (or even gets poorer) from another base year. Table 1US and The caching-up of these countries is by no means steady at the 1992-2013 rates since the earlier base years also. The catching-up achieved in the 1992-2013 period is fragile.
We show income growth acceleration or "miracle" even over 21 years does not mean catching-up over a longer period. Jones and Olken (2008) show growth "miracles" and "failures" are ubiquitous at ten-and fifteen-year periods. Hausmann et al. (2005) classify growth acceleration-episodes (above average growth for eight years) by whether they had negative, poor, or above average growth in the preceding eight and the following 10 years. Easterly et al. (1993) find poor correlations between growth rates across decades. Our results add to this literature that 20 to examine long term economic development and catching-up, we should study countries' experience over periods longer than 21 years, and maybe at least thirty years.
We next consider whether the full convergence time could be shorter with some other rich country as the bench mark. Of the OECD-24 (original OECD-21 plus Japan, Australia, and New Zealand), PWT data since 1950 is available for 23; but many do not satisfy (2). 9 Of those that do, three countries with the lowest PCY growth rate are New Zealand, Australia, and US (in that order). We select New Zealand as the alternative bench mark country so that our sample countries' catching-up rates are the highest and full convergence time the shortest. New Zealand also did not suffer recession in either 1971 or in 1992 -these years can be used as alternative base years for it too. Tables 1NZ and Appendix Tables 1NZ and 2NZ, give results similar to Tables 1US and   Appendix Tables 1US and 2US , respectively; but with New Zealand as the bench mark country.
Comparing Table 1NZ to 1US and Appendix Table 1NZ to Appendix Table 1US , with New
Zealand as the bench mark country, the catching-up rate is uniformly higher, the falling-back rate is uniformly lower, and the time for full convergence uniformly shorter. <Insert Table 1NZ here.>
Comparison is different with 1992 as the base year. Comparing Appendix Table 2NZ to   Appendix Table 2US , when New Zealand is used as the bench mark country instead of the US, the catching-up rate since 1992 is everywhere lower and the full convergence time generally longer; and the median full convergence time (for countries catching up) increases from 187 to 218 years. 
Region's Catch-Up Index
The region-wide averages and dispersion for the country performance when US (New Zealand) is the bench-mark country are presented in the six panels of Table 2US (Table 2NZ) .
Geometric mean (GM) is preferred 11 as the average since it is not affected by extreme values (e.g., 11 GM has an additional advantage in this paper, since (GM of IJt) = (GM of RJt) ÷ (GM of RJ0), J = 1, . . N, where N is the number of countries. Similar relationships between the index and the two income ratios do not exist for their either median or arithmetic mean.
GM of 8, 27, and 125 is 30) while the median does not incorporate values of other observations in it and can be significantly affected by the inclusion/exclusion of an observation. As discussed above, this paper's focus is on inter-country income inequality. Nevertheless, we discuss the population weighted GM of the catch-up index and the region/frontier income ratios and the time for full convergence with the bench mark country towards the end of this section.
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<Insert Tables 2US and 2NZ Asia, the full convergence time increases from 115 to 125 years. Sub-Saharan Africa changes from catching-up -the only period it shows catching-up to the US -to falling behind. Since 1992, it catches-up to the US at 0.41% rate annually; but falls behind New Zealand at 0.24% rate.
. Sala-i-Martin (1990 defines σ-convergence/divergence as a decrease/increase in dispersion of real per capita incomes over time. The dispersion of country PPP PC incomes in a region is given in Tables 2US (and 2NZ) only failed to catch-up to the frontier in a meaningful way or fell behind the frontier sharply, their intra-regional incomes also became more dispersed. Barro (2015) clarifies the iron law takes the form of unconditional absolute convergence for a group of countries that are reasonably homogeneous. Countries in either of these two regions are reasonably homogeneous. Yet, they do not exhibit unconditional absolute convergence. Barro (2015) shows conditional convergence for a sample of 89 countries for the 1970-75 to 2005-10 period -conditional on eleven variables described there-in while not including either labor/population growth rate or technology. As explained above, the convergence shown by such a regression is within group relative convergence rather than absolute convergence. He includes high income countries that Pritchet (1997) shows exhibit absolute convergence and considerable movement towards income-equality with the US and excludes 19 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia -included here -for which data are available in PWT 8/8.1 and 7.0.
Conditional (relative) convergence shown by him may be due to the country-sample used and the 24 specific (eleven) controls included. As noted above, β-convergence does not mean every poorer country in the sample has experienced relative convergence; or at the same rate. Further, as noted by Quah (1996 Quah ( , p. 1048 
where each product is taken with respect to i. That is, the population weighted geometric mean of the catch-up index of a region for year t is the ratio of the weighted GM of each country's incomeratios to the bench-mark country's income for year t to similar weighted GM for the base year.
Unweighted regional catch-up index and full convergence time computed earlier gives the same weight to each country's catching-up. In population weighted GM, a more populous country's catching-up is given more importance in the regional average -the regional average is more influenced by the more populous country. Whether population weighted GM or unweighted GM is used makes for a substantial difference in the results; the year whose population-weights are used does not -since a country's share of a region's population does not change much over the 25 years. We choose 1990 for the population-weights since it is almost in the middle of 1971, the year from which we have data for all countries, and 2013, the final year.
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Compared to unweighted GMs, in both Tables 2US and 2NZ, for 1951-2013 and 1971-2013 , the weighted GMs for Sub-Saharan Africa show a higher falling back rate; for South Asia they show a higher catching up rate. Those for 1992 show a sharply higher catching up rate in both the regions. These results follow from those for India and Nigeria in Tables 1US and 1NZ and in the various figures and appendix tables since their weight in the respective region's population is about 77%. India catches-up at a greater rate than the unweighted GM for South Tables 2US and 2NZ have no operational meaning -since each country follows its independent policies. The projection given in Tables 1US and 1NZ dominate -that India is projected to reach income equality with the US (New Zealand) in 329 (237) years, Pakistan in 5184 (780) years, etc.
Conclusions
The dominant method for about 25 years to test empirically the neo-classical proposition that poorer countries tend to grow faster has been β-convergence regressions. This literature asserts/implies the convergence shown is in income levels and go so far as to assert an "iron law of convergence" under which a 2% faster growing poorer country eliminates 50% of income gap in 35 years and 90% in 115 years. We point out faster growth of poorer countries only means their income ratios with the richer countries are increasing. We call it relative convergence, show neoclassical convergence is relative convergence, and that relative convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for income gap reduction (absolute convergence) which depends on initial conditions also.
β-convergence regressions have limited usefulness estimating poorer-richer country (relative) convergence -the regression result may be driven by richer countries converging with still richer countries in the sample while the lower-level poorer countries are diverging both relatively and absolutely (since relative divergence is sufficient for absolute divergence). The catch-up index directly measures poor-rich convergence, can measure within-group convergence, and unlike the β-convergence, is computed year by year and can help us understand the dynamics and within country/region income variation and inequality over time. The neo-classical theory predicts eventual equality of incomes that is independent of the initial conditions and gives no should be examined to judge successful catching-up, and for projections into the future, the longest period of reliable data should be used. Sub-Saharan Africa shows no possibility of catching-up from the earliest base period; South Asia does: at 0.30% (0.55%) annual rate giving 865 (425) years for full convergence when US (New Zealand) is the bench-mark country. The sample excludes three countries (with 1990 population in parenthesis), Afghanistan (12.1m.), Eritrea (3.1m.), and Somalia (6.3m.), for which PWT data are unavailable; if they were, the two regions' falling behind/lack of catch-up and within-region divergence would most likely increase.
Sub Saharan Africa has achieved faster growth in life expectancy, of 15.6% versus 9.5%
for South Asia. See, Kant (2018) . Nevertheless, Jones and Klenow (2016) find higher within country inequality in developing countries' neutralizes their higher life expectancy growth; and for countries in their sample, their measure of well-being (that also considers leisure and inequality) has a correlation of .98 with real GDP per capita. Real GDP per capita remains the 28 primary statistic of both catching-up and well-being. Using it, we show how persistent intercountry and rich-poor income inequalities are.
